Turkey and Saudi Arabia move from rivalry to strategic partnership
The shift marks a significant change in relations that have been shaped by historical competition, regional disputes and the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have moved from decades of rivalry over influence in the Sunni Muslim world towards a strategic partnership, culminating in a joint defence agreement signed in August 2026 that brings the two countries and Pakistan under a shared security framework.
The shift marks a significant change in relations that have been shaped by historical competition, regional disputes and the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, says the Middle East Eye.
From Ottoman rivalry to pragmatic ties
The roots of the rivalry stretch back to the 19th century, when the House of Saud fought the Ottoman Empire. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 1916 Arab revolt, Saudi forces took control of Mecca and Medina in 1924, ending more than three centuries of Ottoman rule over the two holy cities.
Formal diplomatic relations were established in the 1930s, and ties remained broadly cordial for decades. The two countries found common ground during conflicts including the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990-91 Gulf War.
There were, however, occasional disputes over Islamic cultural heritage. In 2002, Turkey condemned Saudi Arabia's demolition of the historic al-Ajyad fortress in Mecca to make way for pilgrim accommodation and the Clock Tower.
Arab Spring deepens divisions
Relations deteriorated sharply after the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2010, as Ankara and Riyadh adopted competing approaches to regional politics.
In Egypt, Turkey backed Mohamed Morsi, who won elections after the fall of longtime president Hosni Mubarak. Saudi Arabia supported the military-backed removal of Morsi in 2013 and the subsequent rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
The two countries also took opposing positions during the 2017 Saudi-led blockade of Qatar. Turkey supported Doha and expanded its military and economic assistance to the country.
In Libya, Ankara and Riyadh initially supported rival factions following the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi.
The tensions became increasingly explicit. By early 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had referred to Turkey as part of a "triangle of evil" alongside Iran and extremist groups.
Khashoggi killing brings ties to a low
The relationship reached its lowest point following the 2018 murder of Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and critic of the Saudi government, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said the killing had been ordered at the "highest levels" of the Saudi government. The dispute triggered a sharp deterioration in bilateral ties, including mutual media restrictions and an unofficial Saudi boycott of Turkish products.
Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia subsequently fell sharply, declining by 92% by 2021.
Rapprochement takes hold
The two countries began rebuilding relations in 2022 as part of a broader regional rapprochement involving Turkey and the Gulf Arab states.
A key step came when Turkey transferred the legal case concerning Khashoggi's murder to Saudi Arabia, meeting a longstanding Saudi demand.
Economic considerations also encouraged Ankara to repair ties with Riyadh and other wealthy Gulf states as Turkey faced economic pressures and sought foreign investment and financial support.
Defence cooperation provided another important avenue for closer relations. In 2023, Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase Turkish drones in what was described as the largest defence contract in Turkey's history.
The expanding defence relationship has since become part of a broader strategic partnership.
Closer alignment on regional conflicts
By 2026, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have become increasingly aligned on several regional issues.
In Syria, both countries support the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa and have pushed for the lifting of US sanctions. In Sudan, they support the Sudanese Armed Forces, while in Somalia they back the central government, positions that have at times put them at odds with factions supported by the United Arab Emirates.
Their cooperation has now expanded beyond bilateral relations.
The joint defence agreement signed in August 2026, together with Pakistan, places three major Muslim-majority powers within a common security framework. Under the arrangement, an armed attack against one signatory is treated as an attack against all three.
The agreement represents the latest stage in a relationship that has shifted from competition for regional influence towards cooperation on security and geopolitical issues.
Turkey nevertheless remains cautious about openly taking sides in growing tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, given its financial and economic ties with Abu Dhabi.
But the broader direction of Ankara's policy has increasingly brought its strategic interests closer to those of Riyadh, reflecting a regional realignment in which former rivals are finding greater common ground.
