Will North Korea exploit the fog of the Iran war to strike South Korea?
As the US shifts military focus to the Middle East, fears grow that North Korea could exploit the distraction—testing the limits of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula
In a US–Israeli war on Iran crisis, the possibility of a North Korean attack on South Korea remains a topic of intense global scrutiny. The fact that the United States is being stretched in the Middle East could give North Korea a perceived strategic opportunity.
Recently, the US has relocated part of a missile defence system from South Korea to the Middle East. The Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system was first deployed to South Korea in 2017 to protect against threats from nuclear-armed North Korea.
Moreover, US President Donald Trump has ordered 2,000 Marines from Japan to be redeployed to the Persian Gulf as the Iran war intensifies. The redeployment of American military assets from the region to the Middle East has raised national security concerns among US allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Against this backdrop, North Korea may see the US–Iran conflict as a window for invasion. The question remains whether North Korea would try to exploit the distraction of US and allied forces to advance its own peninsula-level goals through a mix of low-level provocations, coercive signalling, and limited nuclear tests, and ultimately engage in a full-scale war over South Korea itself.
In early 2026, during the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un formally solidified a radical shift in policy. He has officially abandoned the goal of "peaceful reunification" and now defines South Korea as its "principal enemy" and a separate, hostile state. Security experts believe this provides a prelude to justify aggressive military actions and nuclear use against South Korea.
North Korea remains committed to expanding its nuclear and missile programmes and poses "significant threats" to South Korea. The country sees the US attack on a non-nuclear Iran as validation of its nuclear weapons programme. Kim Jong Un believes his nuclear arsenal is the ultimate deterrent against the decapitation strikes that killed Iran's leaders. Accordingly, Pyongyang may exploit the situation to advance its nuclear and missile programmes.
North Korea is backed by treaties with China and Russia. Both powers shield North Korea at the UN. Moreover, Pyongyang has strong military ties with these countries. China's priority on the Korean Peninsula is to maintain peace and stability.
Since South Korea has joined US-led sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, Moscow has softened new UN sanctions on North Korea and may help Pyongyang fund its military build-up and nuclear programme—directly undermining South Korea's security.
Russia recently warned against South Korean arms shipments to Ukraine. With North Korean troops having supported Russia's war efforts in Ukraine, Moscow has reciprocated with technical aid for North Korea's satellite and missile programmes.
A North Korean military incursion into South Korea would be treated as crossing a red line by the United States. If Pyongyang were to launch a full-scale invasion of South Korea, this would be expected to trigger a decisive US-led counter-offensive.
South Korea, together with the US and Japan, is developing trilateral plans to counter North Korean special operations and sabotage in rear areas. South Korea's military strategy has become increasingly offensive over the past decade, adopting a "Strategic Target Strike" doctrine. The three-axis system embodies South Korea's pre-emptive and retaliatory strike capabilities, including the infiltration of special forces to eliminate the North Korean leadership.
If North Korea attacks South Korea, Japan would almost certainly play a major but largely indirect military role, along with strong political and logistical support. North Korean missiles that can now reach Japan have raised national security concerns.
Japan would likely serve as the "great logistics hub" and a primary defensive shield for the region as part of a strengthened US–Japan–South Korea security triad. Japan would not send combat troops. Its most certain role would be providing the massive logistical infrastructure required for a US response.
The US military would launch operations from its bases in Japan (e.g., Kadena and Yokosuka). Japan would provide security for these bases, along with fuel, medical facilities, and repair hubs for damaged ships and aircraft.
While North Korea continues to pose a significant military threat with increasingly hostile rhetoric, a full-scale, unprovoked attack on South Korea is considered unlikely in the current strategic environment. However, the situation is not without risk. A minor border skirmish could escalate unexpectedly.
North Korea can use hostile rhetoric and border skirmishes to extract concessions, such as loosened sanctions or greater diplomatic space, by threatening to open a second front for the US.
Both North Korea and South Korea are more confident than before that "reunification" is inevitable in the coming years. With this belief in mind, North Korea is steadily increasing its military activity along the South Korean border. Similarly, South Korea is preparing the political, military, and psychological groundwork for potential future action.
However, South Korea intends to pursue reunification through the collapse of the North Korean regime. If needed, it could engage in covert military operations with strong political and military backing from the United States.
Similarly, North Korea is preparing to take over South Korea either by force or through negotiation. Both sides believe that one day they will be united. Nobody knows how reunification will ultimately occur, or who will control the other.
Dr Sajjad M Jasimuddin is a professor (professeur senior) at Kedge Business School and Head of the Geopolitics Strategy Lab (France). He previously held faculty positions at several universities based in Bangladesh (Dhaka University), Saudi Arabia, the UK, the UAE, and China.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.
