The rise of Bangladesh’s nuclear diplomacy

Bangladesh is on the cusp of joining the world's 33-nation nuclear power club, with the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) expected to begin operation in 2026. The roots of this achievement, however, extend far beyond the current construction activities at Rooppur. They can be traced to President Dwight D Eisenhower's landmark "Atoms for Peace" address in 1953, which laid the foundation for the global nuclear governance architecture – most notably the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), safeguards systems, and international technical cooperation.

This framework enabled newcomer countries to pursue nuclear energy safely, securely, and for peaceful purposes. Building upon this international regime, Bangladesh has gradually developed its nuclear capabilities through decades of cooperation with multiple partners, culminating in its strategic partnership with Russia's State Energy Corporation, Rosatom, for the construction of the country's first NPP.

Bangladesh's nuclear journey began in 1962 with the establishment of the Dhaka Atomic Energy Centre, equipped with a Van de Graaff accelerator, IBM-1620 computers, and Co-60 gamma irradiation sources, acquired with US scientific and technical assistance. Cooperation deepened further with the installation of the 3 MWth TRIGA Mark-II research reactor at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) in Savar, under a 1982 agreement with the United States on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since then, this reactor has served as the backbone of Bangladesh's nuclear infrastructure, supporting isotope production, regulatory development, manpower training, and a wide range of research and development (R&D) activities.

With these foundational capabilities in place, Bangladesh decided to integrate nuclear power into its national energy mix by developing its first NPP at Rooppur, located approximately 160 km north of Dhaka. For this endeavour, Bangladesh established a comprehensive partnership with Russia. Beginning with an intergovernmental agreement in 2011 and culminating in the 2015 Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract valued at $12.65 billion – financed through a 90% Russian state loan – Russia committed not only to construct the plant but also to repatriate all spent nuclear fuel, train Bangladeshi personnel, and provide extensive technical, regulatory, and financial support.

This "build-own-operate-transfer plus repatriation" model is unique in South Asia and effectively addresses two major challenges faced by newcomer nuclear countries: long-term spent-fuel management and proliferation concerns.

The construction of the Rooppur NPP presents a significant opportunity to unlock social, economic, technological, and academic benefits. As a source of affordable, reliable, and low-carbon baseload electricity, nuclear power can play a pivotal role in strengthening national energy security, mitigating climate risks, and improving long-term living standards.

A balanced, patient, and diversified nuclear diplomacy – grounded in transparency, safety, security, non-proliferation, and international cooperation – can ultimately transform Bangladesh's nuclear programme into a symbol of regional stability, technological advancement, and peaceful development.

Bangladesh has also broadened its nuclear diplomacy through a 2018 trilateral cooperation arrangement with India and Russia, under which India supplies non-nuclear equipment and technical services for the Rooppur project. In addition, Bangladesh has established or pursued nuclear cooperation agreements with China, France, Japan, South Korea, and Hungary, reflecting a deliberate multi-vector diplomatic strategy and prudent hedging against over-dependence on a single partner.

This diversified nuclear diplomacy serves three core purposes: enhancing energy security, supporting geopolitical stability, and strengthening soft power. Bangladesh faces an acute electricity challenge, with annual demand growing by 8–10% while domestic gas reserves decline and LNG, oil, and coal remain largely import-dependent. Rooppur's 2,400 MW capacity is expected to supply approximately 10% of projected electricity demand in 2030. Each nuclear fuel load can sustain continuous operation for about 18 months, shielding the country from the volatility of global LNG spot markets that previously destabilised the economy.

Moreover, Russia's commitment to repatriate spent fuel eliminates the need for Bangladesh to construct a permanent deep geological repository – a major obstacle even for advanced nuclear nations. This service cannot be offered by regional neighbours such as India or Pakistan due to their non-recognised nuclear weapon-state status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Bangladesh's commitment to non-proliferation – demonstrated by its accession to the NPT in 1982, implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and adoption of the Additional Protocol – has largely neutralised regional and international concerns. Bangladesh is widely recognised as operating a transparent and peaceful nuclear energy programme. The spent-fuel-return arrangement provides additional assurance by preventing the accumulation of weapons-usable material. At a time when nuclear programmes in some regions generate sanctions, suspicion, or geopolitical anxiety, Bangladesh's approach has fostered cooperation and trust.

This responsible and transparent nuclear posture significantly enhances Bangladesh's soft power. By demonstrating technical competence, regulatory maturity, and adherence to global norms, Bangladesh strengthens its international credibility and diplomatic influence. Nuclear cooperation with multiple partners further expands its international network and reinforces its standing in regional security dialogues, energy governance platforms, and scientific collaboration.

Nevertheless, the completion of Rooppur NPP has been delayed by more than three years from its initial commissioning target of 2023, and the timeline for full operation remains uncertain. These delays, driven largely by economic sanctions and the resulting global supply-chain disruptions associated with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, have imposed substantial economic costs on the country.

Looking ahead, Bangladesh envisions expanding its nuclear capacity through additional reactors at Rooppur or alternative sites to ensure long-term energy security. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission is also preparing to construct a multipurpose high-capacity research reactor at AERE in Savar to meet growing demand for isotope production, materials testing, and advanced R&D. To support this expansion, strengthening the nuclear regulatory body – particularly through the development of comprehensive regulations, standards, and guidance documents with assistance from experienced international regulatory authorities, alongside adoption of a secured long-term fuel-cycle policy – remains a critical national priority.

This raises an essential question: what form of nuclear diplomacy will best support Bangladesh's nuclear initiatives? Over-reliance on any single partner would be strategically unwise. Given evolving geopolitical tensions among Russia, the US, and the EU, Bangladesh should assess their potential implications for its nuclear programme. These dynamics have already influenced project timelines and supply chains. Establishing broader intergovernmental arrangements with the EU and the US could help ensure uninterrupted nuclear growth in Bangladesh despite shifts in international relations. A balanced, patient, and diversified nuclear diplomacy – grounded in transparency, safety, security, non-proliferation, and international cooperation – can ultimately transform Bangladesh's nuclear programme into a symbol of regional stability, technological advancement, and peaceful development.

Dr Md Shafiqul Islam is a professor in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Dhaka University and a former visiting professor in the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, US. Email: msislam@du.ac.bd 

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