Hurdles need to be addressed to strengthen the Bangladesh-India relationship

Bangladesh and India share a relationship rooted in history, geography, culture, and economic interdependence. Expanded connectivity through road, rail, and waterways helps boost trade and regional integration, benefiting both countries. 

During the Hasina regime, improved connectivity became a cornerstone of bilateral relations. The two countries worked to enhance rail and road links, inland waterways, port access, and transit facilities.

Connectivity cooperation transformed bilateral relations through the revival of rail, road, inland waterway, and bus links, the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports by India, and the completion of key projects such as the Akhaura–Agartala rail link and the Khulna–Mongla Port rail line. These links eventually provide India's north-eastern states with access to the Bay of Bengal.

The relationship between Bangladesh and India after the July uprising in 2024 led to cooler ties under the then-interim government. The Bangladesh–India relationship shifted from a close, asymmetric partnership to an openly tense and distrustful phase marked by trade frictions and competing political narratives. 

Bilateral ties featured the mutual summoning of ambassadors, protests around diplomatic missions in both countries, and sharp rhetorical exchanges over the safety of embassies and consulates.

However, Bangladesh's February 2026 elections prompted pledges of a reset, easing visa suspensions and leading to high-level visits by foreign ministry and security officials to India. From Bangladesh's perspective, the bilateral relationship still faces persistent structural and political hurdles that need to be addressed in order to strengthen Bangladesh–India ties.

Water-sharing disputes

Water sharing remains the most crucial issue in the relationship. India and Bangladesh share more than 50 rivers, making water management politically and economically critical. Bangladesh, as a downstream country, depends heavily on rivers that originate in India. 

Disputes such as the Teesta River water-sharing agreement have persisted for years. The 1996 Ganges Water Treaty is set to expire in December 2026. Negotiating its renewal is a high-stakes task, as any perceived unfairness could further inflame nationalist sentiment in Dhaka.

Border management

Border security remains another sensitive issue. India and Bangladesh share a long, porous border of over 4,096 km. Although they share one of the longest land borders in the world, challenges such as illegal crossings, smuggling, and occasional border violence persist. 

In 2011, India's Border Security Force shot dead 15-year-old Felani Khatun while she tried to cross back into Bangladesh. This event sparked national outrage and drew global attention. Strengthening coordination between border forces could reduce tensions and illegal activities by ensuring the humane treatment of civilians and promoting legal cross-border movement.

Economic and trade imbalances

The trade imbalance between Bangladesh and India remains another sensitive and crucial issue. Trade is one of the strongest pillars of the relationship, and India is one of Bangladesh's largest trading partners. However, the trade balance heavily favours India. 

To strengthen ties, both countries must work towards reducing this imbalance by enhancing market access for Bangladeshi goods and simplifying customs procedures.

Security and insurgency concerns

Security and insurgency issues are also key concerns for both countries. Historically, each side has accused militant groups of using the other's territory as a safe haven. Continued coordinated efforts are necessary to address evolving security threats.

Bangladesh's growing economic and defence ties with Pakistan may create strategic anxiety in India. Rather than viewing Dhaka's diversified foreign policy with suspicion, India should offer competitive, high-quality alternatives. A stable and secure region benefits not only Bangladesh and India but also other neighbouring countries.

Lack of trust

There is distrust between Bangladesh and India due to ongoing issues and unfortunate events. Geopolitically, Bangladesh has moved closer to China and is seen as more open to engaging with Pakistan. India views this as a strategic risk for its north-eastern states.

Following the 2024 political transition in Bangladesh, violence against minorities strained ties, with India viewing it as targeted. Violence against minorities in Bangladesh, and perceptions of insecurity among Hindu communities, have provoked protests and strong reactions in India. 

Bangladesh maintains that the issue is internal and is often exaggerated for political leverage, with officials and commentators also accusing sections of the Indian media of spreading misleading or false narratives to inflame tensions. Moreover, Bangladesh questions the treatment that Muslims, other minorities, and migrant communities receive in India. 

Following the July uprising, a surge in anti-India rhetoric occurred, fuelled by perceptions that India had unconditionally backed the Hasina regime. 

India's decision to host Sheikh Hasina in exile has been perceived by sections of Bangladesh's political class as tacit support for the former regime. 

Many people in Bangladesh also point fingers at India over the BDR massacre in 2009. The involvement of a foreign force was alleged by some during investigations into the massacre of army officers.

Moreover, Bangladesh has formally accused corruption and overpricing in its long-term electricity import arrangement with India's Adani Group. Critics argue that the previous Awami League government entered into a systematically collusive deal that charges Bangladesh up to around 50 per cent more than market-competitive rates.

Nevertheless, energy is an emerging area of strong collaboration between India and Bangladesh. India exports electricity to Bangladesh, and both countries are engaged in joint energy projects, including power plants and renewable energy initiatives. The Israel–United States war on Iran has severely disrupted global energy markets, particularly affecting oil-dependent economies such as Bangladesh. India, as a regionally energy-secure partner, can play a critical stabilising role by expanding diesel and gas supplies to Bangladesh, leveraging existing infrastructure, and anchoring longer-term energy security cooperation.

India has already begun supplying high-speed diesel to Bangladesh via the India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, delivering 5,000 tonnes in March 2026. These shipments are crucial for Bangladesh's power generation and transport sectors, which are facing acute fuel shortages. This cooperation could help enhance energy security and support economic growth in the region.

Apparently, no clear red lines have been drawn by either side. If Bangladesh or India identifies perceived red lines after further developments, these should be clearly communicated to the other side. Bridging the trust deficit with the new leadership and the Bangladeshi public should be a critical priority for the Indian government if it wishes to strengthen Bangladesh–India relations.

Dr Sajjad M Jasimuddin is a professor (professeur senior) at Kedge Business School and Head of the Geopolitics Strategy Lab (France). He previously held faculty positions at several universities based in Bangladesh (Dhaka University), Saudi Arabia, the UK, the UAE, and China. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.