How development failures threaten Bangladesh’s national stability

To the outside world, Bangladesh has long treated development and security as two separate arenas: one for planners and economists, the other for administrators and law-enforcement agencies. That distinction no longer holds. Today, development pressures lie at the core of Bangladesh's security challenges—more so than external threats or overt political confrontation. 

The shrinking area of agricultural land, the declining number of farmers, a growing yet under-skilled youth population, demographic pressure, and a chronic energy crunch are no longer merely economic concerns; they are reshaping the country's internal stability and long-term resilience.

When development failures persist without timely correction, they begin to manifest as insecurity—social frustration, declining investor confidence, intensified informal competition over resources, and eroding trust in institutions. Bangladesh is experiencing precisely this dynamic, where the cost of inaction will far exceed the cost of reform.

Among the most visible pressures is the alarming depletion of arable land. Farmland is being lost at an estimated rate of 65,000–70,000 hectares annually due to unplanned urbanisation, infrastructure expansion, and industrial growth. 

Between 2015 and 2023 alone, more than 1,400 square kilometres of agricultural land were converted to non-agricultural use. In one of the world's most densely populated countries, such degradation places food security and rural livelihoods at risk. When domestic food production becomes vulnerable, global price fluctuations and supply shocks are more easily transmitted—turning an agricultural issue into a strategic weakness.

This loss is compounded by the steady decline in the farming population. Agriculture remains a major employer, yet it holds little appeal for younger generations. Fragmented landholdings—often less than 0.25 hectares—low profitability, climate risk, and limited mechanisation have driven young people away from farming. 

The result is an ageing agricultural workforce, slower productivity growth, and weak innovation. A country unable to replenish its farming base risks not only food self-sufficiency but also social stability in rural areas.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh is experiencing a demographic surge without adequate skill formation. Although headline unemployment appears moderate, youth unemployment (ages 15–24) is roughly three times the national average. More troubling is its composition: a significant share of the unemployed are formally educated, including university graduates. 

This reflects a severe mismatch between educational output and labour market demand. Underemployed or economically disengaged young people represent not only a wasted investment but also a latent source of instability.

These pressures are further intensified by continued population growth. Each year, millions more citizens increase demand for food, jobs, housing, energy, and public services. When supply systems fail to expand in line with demand, competition shifts into informal and unregulated spaces. This manifests in underemployment, declining civic discipline, and growing reliance on non-institutional solutions—gradually eroding state authority and weakening social cohesion.

Energy insecurity sits at the centre of this development–security nexus. Installed power capacity has expanded, yet reliability remains inconsistent due to fuel shortages, high generation costs, and transmission constraints. Domestic gas production has stagnated, increasing dependence on imported LNG and fuel oil. For industry and investors, predictability matters more than price. Power outages and gas instability disrupt production, delay projects, and undermine long-term planning confidence.

By 2030, Bangladesh's electricity demand is projected to exceed 25,000 megawatts, requiring not only additional capacity but also fuel security, grid stability, and fiscal discipline. Heavy reliance on imported energy exposes the economy to global price volatility and foreign exchange risk. Such shocks quickly translate into inflation and public dissatisfaction—again transforming development stress into security strain.

Taken together—shrinking farmland, declining farmers, under-skilled youth, demographic pressure, and energy vulnerability—Bangladesh faces a structural trap. Growth becomes harder to sustain, employment more difficult to generate, and public trust increasingly fragile. In such a context, traditional security responses—enforcement, containment, reactive management—offer only temporary relief. Symptoms can be suppressed; structural strain cannot.

Experience in public administration and development planning repeatedly demonstrates that security crises are treated as downstream events, addressed only after they surface. In reality, insecurity is seeded much earlier—in neglected sectors and postponed decisions. Once farmers lose land, youth lose opportunity, or factories lose power, the burden falls upon the security apparatus at far greater cost.

What Bangladesh requires now is a recalibration of national priorities. First, agricultural land conservation must be treated as a strategic imperative, not merely a planning concern. Zoning laws must be enforced, prime farmland protected, and vertical urban development encouraged. Second, food security policy should shift towards strengthening value chains, promoting mechanisation, and ensuring farmers' income security, rather than focusing solely on output targets. 

Third, youth policy must prioritise employability over enrolment—through market-relevant skills, apprenticeships, and stronger industry linkages. Fourth, energy planning should emphasise reliability, domestic resource development, and realistic demand forecasting rather than headline capacity figures. Finally, population management and urban service delivery must be integrated into long-term security strategy, not treated as marginal social issues.

Bangladesh's future security will not be shaped solely by borders or battalions. It will be determined by how effectively the country feeds itself, educates its youth, powers its industries, and develops sustainably. Growth and security are no longer separate agendas. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh can develop, but whether it can do so without destabilising itself in the process.

Maj Gen (Retd) Md Nazrul Islam is a former executive chairman of BEPZA, a retired Major General of the Bangladesh Army, and a PhD researcher on technology, workforce transformation, and industrial competitiveness.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard