Dhaka’s strategic shift leaves ties with Delhi in doldrums

Bangladesh's foreign policy appears to be shifting decisively away from India and towards a strategic partnership with China. The change was discernible during the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. The BNP government under Tarique Rahman has stayed on the same trajectory and now appears to be accelerating the shift from the Indian to the Chinese orbit.

Developments over the past few days have illustrated this shift.

Dhaka's recent announcement that it is preparing to enter negotiations with Beijing to purchase 24 J-10C multirole fighter jets is perhaps the clearest sign yet that relations with China will now go deeper than the close business ties developed during former prime minister Sheikh Hasina's tenure. Tarique Rahman's government appears intent on anchoring Bangladesh's defence and strategic interests more firmly to China.

This comes amid an unprecedented low in Dhaka-New Delhi relations.

Bilateral ties have been strained, to put it mildly, since the fall of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024. But in recent days, relations appear to have taken a further nosedive, with no sign of either side being able to pull out of it.

Repeated Indian attempts to persuade Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to visit Delhi appear to have hit a brick wall. On 16 August, Bangladesh's foreign ministry issued a statement that, for all practical purposes, shut the door on such a visit. Dhaka wants to see "a propitious environment" for the visit, which, according to the government, would only be possible after Hasina's extradition.

With Dhaka-Delhi relations in the doldrums, Bangladesh has moved to take its ties with China up a gear.

Chinese warplanes in the mix

The announcement on 25 August of the potential purchase of J-10C fighters may have been timed to send a message to Delhi, coming as it did at one of the lowest points in bilateral ties in two years.

Two comments by the government spokesman were particularly notable.

First, the spokesman said Bangladesh could not have taken such a strategic decision "independently" in the past. This was likely a reference to Sheikh Hasina's tenure, when Dhaka was frequently accused of being unable to take key decisions without Delhi's consent.

Second, and more pointedly, the decision to buy Chinese J-10Cs was justified by citing the performance of Pakistan's Chinese-built fighters against the Indian Air Force last May. This was perhaps intended to rub some verbal salt into India's wounds.

During the four-day air battle between Pakistan and India from 7 to 10 May last year, Islamabad claimed to have shot down five to seven Indian aircraft without losing any of its own. India, on the other hand, said it had struck several terrorist camps and a number of airbases deep inside Pakistan.

Indian defence analysts subsequently suggested that China's People's Liberation Army had provided real-time battlefield intelligence to the Pakistan Air Force through satellite and other data links, giving the J-10Cs, equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles, an advantage over Indian jets.

Whether Bangladesh's J-10Cs would be delivered with the longer-range PL-15 missiles, and whether China would guarantee satellite support in any future conflict, is unclear. Such details may never be made public.

But the message to Delhi from Dhaka is unmistakable: Bangladesh is arming itself with weaponry from China, India's strategic rival, while simultaneously pursuing closer defence cooperation with Pakistan, India's traditional adversary.

The message to Delhi from Dhaka is unmistakable: Bangladesh is arming itself with weaponry from China, India's strategic rival, while simultaneously pursuing closer defence cooperation with Pakistan, India's traditional adversary.

Visit to Delhi in limbo

Closer strategic cooperation with China was always on the cards, particularly after Tarique Rahman's visit to Beijing in June.

But the downward spiral in relations with India was probably not on anyone's "will happen" list. While ties remained practically frozen during the Yunus government's 18 months in office, there were signs of warmth immediately after the 12 February elections.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick to congratulate Rahman on his electoral victory. He followed that by inviting the new prime minister to visit Delhi with his family after Rahman took the oath of office.

But the warmth from Delhi was not reciprocated by Dhaka. Apparently, Bangladesh planned to take its time to reorder its foreign alignments rather than rush into a rapprochement with India.

High-level dialogue between the two neighbours remains elusive, as Rahman's much-anticipated visit to Delhi stays in limbo. Bangladesh is adamant that such a visit cannot take place until Sheikh Hasina is extradited to face trial in Bangladesh.

For its part, India has indicated that, since Hasina plans to return voluntarily in December, there is little point in going through an extradition process that could take years. India also appears unwilling to prevent Hasina from making public statements from Delhi, which is another of Dhaka's red lines.

Hasina's 5 August address to members of the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Delhi apparently triggered the latest downward spiral in relations, although it was not her first interaction with journalists at the FCC.

Optimism dashed

The government's initial reaction, which included attributing crimes to Hasina for which she had not been charged, appeared aimed largely at a domestic audience and intended to demonstrate its anger. Decision-makers in Delhi, however, would no doubt have taken note of the outrage expressed in the government's press release.

For a while, it appeared to have had the desired effect, as there was a flurry of activity from India aimed at cooling tensions. A further invitation to Rahman, along with assurances of a "memorable visit", was extended to ensure that the Bangladeshi side felt adequately valued and respected.

The two sides appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough — until they were not.

Evidently, there is tremendous pressure from hardline sections of the BNP, as well as the NCP and Jamaat-e-Islami, against a visit to India by Tarique Rahman.

In the current domestic political climate, anti-India sentiment clearly holds sway over the government's decision-making process. Opposition to the visit is couched in the same terms: no visit until Hasina is "extradited".

There is little doubt that relations with India should be at the top of the Foreign Ministry's "to manage" list. But the post-2024 political reality appears to have put the brakes on whatever moves, if any, the ministry may have been considering.

Tarique Rahman's decision to travel to China soon after receiving Beijing's invitation sent a clear message to India: the centre of gravity of Dhaka's foreign policy was shifting eastwards.

'Over-eager' India

However, it is entirely possible to build closer ties with China, even at the strategic level, while simultaneously rebuilding relations with India. Delhi's overtures suggested that India was not averse to rebuilding ties even as Bangladesh pursued closer cooperation with China and the United States.

The question is whether India's apparent "eagerness" to improve ties — including repeated invitations to Tarique Rahman — has been interpreted in Dhaka as a sign of weakness.

In some quarters, India is seen as a country that badly mishandled its relations with Bangladesh in the past and is now desperately trying to make amends through its overtures to Tarique Rahman.

In this scenario, the initiative is firmly in Dhaka's hands. This would appear to give Bangladesh an ideal position from which to extract concessions from India on a range of issues that have plagued bilateral ties — from the sharing of common rivers and border killings to the huge trade imbalance, unfavourable energy deals, and securing fair compensation for transit and transhipment arrangements.

To negotiate successfully, however, Bangladeshi leaders need to sit across the table from their Indian counterparts. That is the only way to "look them in the eye" and negotiate.

Instead, Dhaka appears to be using its current high ground to pressure India over the issue of Sheikh Hasina alone, with the media serving as a conduit.

Faltering diplomacy

Hasina's presence in Delhi was often cited by the Yunus government as a key reason for the poor state of bilateral relations. The post-election scenario appeared to offer an opportunity for improvement. It was expected that cooler, more pragmatic heads would prevail in both capitals and that the two sides would find a way to work around the thorny issue of Hasina.

That hope has proved premature.

It is still unclear what the BNP government's end goal is when it comes to resuming meaningful engagement with India. Allowing the entire gamut of bilateral problems to be held hostage to a single issue does not appear to be a sign of pragmatic or mature diplomacy.

It is increasingly possible that the government in Dhaka does not actually wish to deal with Hasina's presence in India. Hasina's return to Bangladesh — even if she were jailed and faced the death penalty — could prove politically complicated and risky for the BNP government to handle.

Demanding "extradition" before anything else, while ignoring her stated plan to return voluntarily, has become a convenient way to keep decisions regarding relations with India on the back burner.

The problem is that geography cannot be changed. India and Bangladesh are stuck with each other. Sooner or later, they will have to come to terms with each other's existence, interests and aspirations.

Sabir Mustafa is a Journalist and Podcaster. He can be reached at sabir.mustafa@gmail.com. His X handle is @Sabir59. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.