The cycle of custodial deaths, enforced disappearances and the culture of impunity in Bangladesh: What should we do immediately?

According to Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), 52 people had died in custody by May this year. Another source reports that 39 more prisoners died during the first three months of 2026 alone.

The grim pattern continued on 26 June, when a young man died in police custody, and again on 9 July, when another prisoner died in detention. On the same day, the body of a 22-year-old suspect was found hanging inside a police station.

The media have also reported another alleged case of enforced disappearance — the first reported since 5 July 2024 — alongside the filing of a writ petition before the High Court Division.

These recurring incidents demonstrate that custodial torture, custodial deaths and enforced disappearances continue in Bangladesh despite the promises of reform made by the new government.

We cannot ignore abuses committed by security forces or within judicial custody. If left unaddressed, Bangladesh risks normalising a system in which human life is cheap and accountability is hollow. Continued custodial deaths will inevitably erode public confidence in the constitutional guarantees of life and liberty and weaken the relationship between the state and its citizens.

Immediate action is needed to restore accountability within the disciplined forces and strengthen judicial oversight. The pressing constitutional question is this: what role should the Supreme Court play in preventing custodial deaths and enforced disappearances? The answer will determine whether Bangladesh's constitutional commitment to justice remains meaningful or becomes little more than procedural rhetoric.

Bangladesh acceded to the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT) in 1998. The Constitution expressly prohibits torture, and several statutes criminalise custodial torture and related offences. Yet custodial torture and deaths remain persistent human rights concerns. Reports by human rights organisations continue to point to a deeply entrenched culture of impunity and institutional practices that shield members of the disciplined forces from accountability.

Numerous writ petitions concerning custodial torture, custodial deaths and enforced disappearances have remained pending before the Supreme Court for years. Despite falling squarely within the Court's constitutional jurisdiction of judicial review, many have not received meaningful hearings.

This raises an important constitutional question. Is the Supreme Court failing to exercise its constitutional mandate, or is it consciously deferring to the ordinary criminal justice system? The distinction matters because constitutional remedies and criminal remedies are separate, independent and complementary. One does not replace the other.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's handling of the Rubel case deserves careful scrutiny. The Court bears a dual constitutional responsibility: first, to protect fundamental rights; and second, to exercise judicial review over gross abuses of public power by the disciplined forces.

Rubel, a university student, was arrested on suspicion and died after being tortured in police custody within five hours of his arrest. The incident triggered nationwide public outrage, prompting the government to establish a one-member judicial inquiry commission within weeks.

When the case reached the Appellate Division (AD) in 2016, the Court declared the arrest unlawful and issued guidelines for the disciplined forces. Although the AD acknowledged the existence of the inquiry commission, it neither disclosed the commission's findings nor directed the government to place the report before the Court.

More significantly, both the High Court Division (HCD) and the AD described Rubel's death as a "disputed question of fact", despite prima facie evidence of multiple constitutional violations. These included unlawful arrest, inhuman and degrading treatment, custodial torture resulting in death and a gross breach of public duty by police officers.

Neither Court explained why the death should be treated as a disputed factual issue, particularly when no criminal trial was before them. Nor did they clarify whether the proceedings concerned criminal liability or the independent constitutional protection of the right to life.

This approach stands in sharp contrast to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India. In landmark constitutional decisions such as Rudul Shah (1983), Sebastian M. Hongray (1984), Bhim Singh (1985), Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v State of Bihar (1987) and Nilabati Behera (1993), the Indian Court developed a distinct constitutional remedy for violations of fundamental rights independent of criminal prosecution. That jurisprudence was later reinforced through the National Human Rights Commission of India.

By contrast, the AD did not meaningfully examine Articles 32, 33, 35(5), 44 and 102 of the Constitution, which collectively establish an independent constitutional framework for the protection and enforcement of fundamental rights. These constitutional protections are separate from the criminal law regime. The Court's failure to engage with them represents a missed opportunity to develop meaningful constitutional jurisprudence.

Although a murder case was eventually filed against 14 individuals in the Rubel case, the HCD later acquitted 11 of the 12 persons convicted at trial. But the constitutional question extends well beyond the outcome of any criminal prosecution.

Is the constitutional guarantee of life and liberty satisfied merely because criminal proceedings are initiated? If criminal law is treated as the sole remedy for custodial torture and extrajudicial killings, then the Constitution's protection of fundamental rights risks becoming largely symbolic.

The AD's 125-page judgment extensively referred to international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and the 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.

Yet, unlike the Indian Supreme Court, the AD did not explain how custodial torture by state agents constitutes an independent violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of criminal liability.

The Court also praised the Prevention of Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act 2013 as model legislation. However, it offered little critical analysis of the Act's effectiveness or its practical limitations. More importantly, as a penal statute, the Act cannot substitute for constitutional remedies available to victims of torture and unlawful killings.

By focusing primarily on criminal prosecution, the AD effectively blurred the distinction between constitutional violations and criminal offences. That approach is illustrated by the fact that although BLAST submitted a list of 227 victims of extrajudicial killings between 1996 and 2002, the Court did not direct the government either to initiate criminal proceedings in those cases or to establish an independent inquiry commission.

Custodial torture, custodial deaths and enforced disappearances are likely to continue unless the Supreme Court clearly recognises that constitutional accountability is distinct from criminal punishment. Human rights violations cannot be reduced to questions of criminal liability alone.

A longstanding orthodoxy persists among judges and legal scholars that the state's responsibility ends once criminal sanctions are imposed. This conservative approach has impeded the development of constitutional remedies and weakened the role envisioned for the National Human Rights Commission under the NHRC Act.

The result is a significant accountability gap. By relying almost exclusively on criminal law, the constitutional system has failed to develop effective public law remedies capable of preventing recurring abuses by state agencies.

It is therefore time for both the High Court Division and the Appellate Division to revisit this jurisprudence. They should promptly hear the long-pending writ petitions concerning custodial torture, custodial deaths and enforced disappearances, including the writ petition filed in the Miraj Sheikh case. More importantly, they should develop a coherent constitutional framework that treats these violations not merely as criminal offences but as grave breaches of fundamental rights requiring independent constitutional remedies.

Only then can the Constitution's guarantees of life, liberty and human dignity become practical realities rather than aspirational promises.

Md Abdul Halim is an Advocate of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. He may be reached at halim_md@yahoo.co.uk.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Business Standard.