Bangladesh trapped in a cycle of retribution: When will it end?

Bangladesh's politics has long followed an unwritten rule when power changes hands: whenever a new government comes to power, an almost automatic process begins of dismantling the appointments, officials, judges and institutional structures put in place by the previous government. 

The result of this vindictive, zero-sum politics has been singularly damaging: institutions have grown progressively weaker, investor confidence has been shaken, and every political transition has pushed the country towards a fresh bout of instability. 

The country witnessed yet another transfer of power through the July-August uprising of 2024, and in February 2026, the BNP formed a government following elections. The question is: will the old cycle be repeated once again, or will the nation finally move towards genuine political reconciliation?

Bangladesh continues to revolve in a cycle of retribution and retaliation.

Although the 1972 Constitution, framed soon after independence, made a democratic commitment, a culture of political tolerance failed to take root. During every subsequent regime, changes in political power have been accompanied by sweeping purges in the administration and judiciary. 

The two major mass uprisings that marked Bangladesh's return to democracy after military rule—the anti-Ershad movement of 1990 and the student-people's uprising of 2024—both succeeded in removing the authoritarian regimes of their time. Yet the political structures that followed repeatedly turned into new versions of the old politics of retribution.

The tendency to use state forces as instruments to suppress political opponents under successive regimes has frequently drawn criticism from international human rights organisations. The administrative reshuffles undertaken by the interim government after the 2024 uprising also reflected the old pattern—from DCs and SPs who had served during the elections to controversial officials, large numbers were placed on OSD (attached) status. 

What is worrying is that even after the new elected government came to power in 2026, large-scale reshuffles in the administration, transfers of secretaries and the attachment of police officials have continued. This demonstrates that the culture of retribution remains institutionally entrenched; its character does not change merely because one political party replaces another.

The picture is much the same in the judiciary. From the very beginning of constitution-making, there was a commitment to keep the appointment, transfer and promotion of judges free from executive influence. 

Yet that arrangement was altered through the Fourth Amendment. In the decades that followed, the fact that the transfers, leave and disciplinary proceedings of judges of the subordinate courts remained under the executive repeatedly raised questions about the judiciary's true independence. 

In 2025, the interim government issued an ordinance to establish a separate Supreme Court Secretariat, but legal experts have questioned whether structural separation alone can ensure the judiciary's full independence.

The most tangible consequences of political instability are felt in the economy. Corruption and the lack of policy continuity are among the biggest obstacles to attracting foreign investment, while countries such as India and Vietnam have moved ahead through policy reforms. No foreign investor is willing to make a long-term commitment without assurances regarding the repatriation of profits and continuity in the legal framework.

Domestic entrepreneurs, too, face the same predicament. With every change of government comes the possibility of changes in policies, tax structures, business approval processes and even priorities for project implementation, making long-term planning increasingly difficult. 

Political instability, a deterioration in law and order, and the dollar shortage have together kept the investment climate deeply uncertain. As a result, Bangladesh, once regarded as a growth model in South Asia, now faces the risk of falling behind its neighbours in attracting investment.

So, what needs to be done now? What should the roadmap to a lasting solution look like?

Bipartisan consensus is not impossible. What is needed is to transform it from a tool for managing temporary crises into a permanent institutional framework. Several specific measures could be considered in this regard.

First, there is a need to establish a permanent bipartisan (multiparty) national commission that would, regardless of the outcome of elections, bring together representatives of the ruling and opposition parties at least two or three times a year to hold dialogue on unresolved issues concerning the Constitution, the electoral system and the structure of governance. 

The model of the National Consensus Commission could be given a constitutional basis and transformed from a temporary arrangement into a permanent institution, so that every new government does not have to begin the process of consensus-building from scratch.

Second, constitutional and statutory bodies—including the Election Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, Bangladesh Bank, public administration and police administration, and the lower courts—must be insulated from partisan influence through transparent, merit-based and legally protected procedures for appointments, transfers and promotions. The separation of the Supreme Court Secretariat is a good beginning, but such an initiative must lead to genuine operational independence rather than remain confined to reform on paper. 

This requires reducing the executive's exclusive influence over appointment committees and ensuring fixed tenures and protection against arbitrary removal. The practice of placing large numbers of officials on OSD status after every change of government must end, and disciplinary action should be taken only on the basis of proven misconduct or corruption.

Third, a fundamental constitutional consensus is needed on the orderly transfer of power, one that remains outside the political disputes surrounding every election. 

The understanding reached through the July Charter on restoring the caretaker government system and establishing an independent Election Commission must be turned into a long-term commitment by all major political forces—both those in government and those in opposition—so that no party, once in power, can attempt to unilaterally alter this framework in the future. 

Accepting election results and allowing the defeated side to play a meaningful role as the opposition should also be an integral part of this consensus.

Indeed, Bangladesh's political history has repeatedly shown that the politics of retribution is not the monopoly of any single party. It is an institutional and cultural vicious circle that returns with a new face every time power changes hands. What is needed now is a durable system in which the judiciary, administration and constitutional bodies do not depend on which party is in power, but function on the basis of the rule of law and professionalism. 

Only then will long-term investment, institutional stability and democratic sustainability become possible. Otherwise, every new election will remain merely the next chapter in an unending story of political revenge.

Shoyeb Arefin is a columnist. Email: shoyebarefin@gmail.com 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of The Business Standard.